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Summary
At 40 percent of Medicare’s and of Medicaid’s costs,1 
the 9 million dual eligibles,2 who receive benefits from 
both programs, are a focus of efforts to slow growth 
in entitlement spending. But, given the two programs’ 
responsibilities, policy-makers are relying far too heavily  
on states to find the solution.
Dollars spent on dual eligibles are overwhelmingly 
federal; potential savings come from better management 
of Medicare-financed acute care services; and enhanced 
state, rather than federal, responsibility for overall spending 
increases the risk of cost-shifting to Medicare and may 
undermine quality of care for vulnerable beneficiaries.
Why Dual Eligibles are 
Primarily a Medicare 
Responsibility
The federal government is 
overwhelmingly responsible for 
spending on dual eligibles, and 
improvements in Medicare-financed 
services—at the core of the Affordable 
Care Act’s (ACA’s) payment and delivery 
reform—are the most direct path to 
better care at lower costs.
•	 The	federal	government	pays	the	bulk	
of	care	costs	for	dual	eligibles. Of the 
$319.5 billion estimated as spent on 
duals in 2011, 80 percent ($256.6 
billion) are federal dollars, more than 
two-thirds of which flowed through 
Medicare.3
•	 Improvement	in	Medicare-financed	
care	is	the	key	to	spending	control.	
Prevention of unnecessary hospital 
use—almost fully financed by 
Medicare—is widely recognized as 
the most immediate target for both 
spending reductions and quality 
improvements in care for dual eligibles.
 » Dual eligibles experience far higher 
rates of “potentially preventable 
hospital admissions” than other 
Medicare beneficiaries: more than 
twice as high for pressure ulcers, 
asthma and diabetes; 52 percent 
higher for urinary tract infection; 
and over 30 percent higher for 
chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disease and bacterial pneumonia.4
 » Estimates of potentially avoidable 
rehospitalizations of nursing  
home residents—which shift costs 
from Medicaid-financed nursing 
benefits to Medicare-financed 
hospital and skilled nursing facility 
(SNF) benefits—range from 18 
percent to 40 percent.5
•	 The	ACA	charges	Medicare	with	
improving	medical	care. Better 
coordination of Medicare-financed 
care for beneficiaries at high risk 
of hospitalization is at the heart 
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of payment and delivery reforms 
promoted by the ACA. Reporting 
on the experience from Medicare 
care coordination demonstrations, 
Randy Brown emphasized that 
significant reductions in hospital 
use (from 17 to 24 percent) and in 
Medicare costs (by 10 to 20 percent) 
were achieved by interventions 
that targeted beneficiaries at risk of 
preventable admissions; emphasized 
in-person patient-coordinator contact; 
collected and responded to timely 
information on hospital admissions 
and emergency room visits, established 
close relationships between care 
coordinators and primary care 
physicians; and actively promoted 
training in self-management skills.6 
The Risk From Putting 
States and Medicaid  
in the Lead
States’ expenditures on dual eligibles 
focus overwhelmingly on long-term 
supports and services—not medical  
care. Although states have developed 
managed care for Medicaid’s younger 
enrollees, they lack experience in 
managing dual eligibles’ medical care,  
and face continued incentives to 
substitute federal Medicare for state 
Medicaid spending, in order to control 
their expenditures.
•	 Medicaid	pays	for	dual	eligibles’	long-
term,	not	acute,	care.	70 percent of 
Medicaid’s total spending for dual 
eligibles goes to long-term services 
and supports (77% when its payments 
for Medicare Part B premiums are 
excluded).7 Only 30 percent of 
dual eligibles actually receive these 
services;8 for most dual eligibles, 
Medicaid plays a limited, primarily 
financial role--paying premiums, some 
cost-sharing, and wrap-around services 
(such as vision and dental care) that 
Medicare does not cover.
•	 States	recognize	that	Medicare,	
not	Medicaid,	will	be	the	primary	
beneficiary	of	care	improvements.	
Along with federal rules assuring 
dual eligibles, like other Medicare 
beneficiaries, a choice of providers, 
limited financial returns from better 
coordinated acute care and reduced 
hospital use have deterred states from 
investing in delivery innovations.9
•	 Most	Medicaid	managed	care	plans	do	
not	deal	with	dual	eligibles.	Although 
Medicaid has come to rely heavily 
on managed care for the bulk of its 
beneficiaries who are low-income 
children and families, Medicaid 
managed care plans lack both 
experience and capacity to handle  
the care needs of the most expensive 
dual eligibles.10
•	 Offering	states	an	opportunity	to	
share	in	these	financial	benefits—
without	sufficient	constraints—risks	
enabling,	rather	than	reducing,	cost-
shifting	from	state	to	federal	budgets.	
Assigning states responsibility over 
Medicare, as well as Medicaid funds 
for dual eligibles (as authorized by 
the ACA and contemplated in some 
policy proposals11), would allow 
states to substitute Medicare funds 
for expenditures Medicaid would 
otherwise make. Noting the power  
of this incentive, the Medicare Payment 
Advisory Comission (MedPAC) advises 
caution in its pursuit.12
•	 A	single-minded	budgetary	focus,	
whether	in	Medicare	or	Medicaid,	runs	
the	risk	of	promoting	cost	savings	at	
beneficiaries’	expense. Dual eligibles, 
as Medicare beneficiaries, are entitled 
to consumer protections not always 
available to low-income Medicaid 
beneficiaries. Without substantial 
oversight, shifting responsibility for 
their Medicare services to Medicaid 
programs may forfeit these protections 
and create financial incentives to limit 
care for high-need beneficiaries.13 
The Need for  
Medicare Leadership
The Affordable Care Act significantly 
elevated attention to better care for 
dual eligibles through the establishment 
of the Medicare-Medicaid Coordinated 
Care Office, which has launched a 
number of initiatives to better align the 
programs. However, with respect to 
payment and delivery reforms, the focus 
is overwhelmingly on state and Medicaid, 
rather than federal Medicare, initiatives. 
Medicare must step up—with measures 
that include the following:
•	 Aggressive	oversight	and	“pay-for-
performance”	in	Medicare	Special	
Needs	Plans	(SNPs).	Medicare Special 
Needs Plans, specialized Medicare 
Advantage plans, were created in 
2003 legislation, with the authority 
to serve specialized populations, 
including dual eligibles and residents 
of institutions.	Dual eligibles constitute 
about a million of the 1.3 million 
people enrolled in SNPs.14 But unlike 
payment and delivery reforms newly 
authorized by the ACA, Medicare 
pays SNPs on a capitation basis, and 
does not hold them accountable for 
performance on measures related to 
patient experience, hospital admission 
and readmission rates, emergency 
room use, medication errors, or 
institutionalization for long-term  
care.15 Medicare should significantly 
alter SNP reporting requirements  
and, even more important, tie payment 
rates to performance standards related 
to quality care.
•	 Emphasis	on	dual	eligibles,	especially	
those	using	long-term	supports	and	
services,	in	ACA-authorized	Medicare	
payment	and	delivery	reforms.	Running 
the gamut from pay-for-performance 
initiatives that include penalties to 
hospitals for excessive readmissions; 
through innovations to improve 
transitional care for patients leaving 
the hospital and bundle hospital and 
post-hospital payment; to financial 
incentives for providers who agree 
to serve as “medical homes” or, 
more broadly, accountable care 
organizations, ACA initiatives  
promote better primary care  
and care coordination to reduce 
unnecessary use of expensive  
services. Although, the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS) are only beginning to 
implement these initiatives, they 
seem to have little if any focus on 
the dual-eligible population—which, 
as noted at the outset, has been 
regarded as Medicaid’s, not Medicare’s 
responsibility. But chronically ill 
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people with impairments—about 
half of whom are dual eligibles—are 
likely to benefit substantially from 
these initiatives, and yield Medicare 
substantial savings in the process. 
Research for a forthcoming SCAN 
Foundation analysis of 2006 data 
shows that dual-eligible beneficiaries 
with chronic conditions and functional 
limitations are one-third more likely 
than beneficiaries with three chronic 
conditions and no impairments to use 
inpatient hospital care (32% vs. 24%); 
and, as a result, incurred more than 
50 percent higher hospital spending 
per beneficiary ($4,900 vs. $3,200 per 
beneficiary).16
•	 SNF	payment	policies	to	prevent	
unnecessary	hospitalizations	for	
nursing	home	residents. Nursing 
homes that hospitalize their residents 
fail to provide residents adequate 
nursing and medical care, increase 
Medicare hospital costs, and, when 
the patient returns to the nursing 
home, receive Medicare SNF 
payments at rates higher than those 
Medicaid pays. Because this practice 
reduces Medicaid’s costs while 
increasing Medicare’s, correcting it 
is unlikely to become a state priority. 
Medicare must take the lead. 
Inappropriate hospital admissions and 
SNF readmissions are a sign of poor-
quality care that can be addressed 
through Medicare payment policy—
going beyond CMS’s solicitation of 
proposals to “help states” reduce 
these unnecessary hospitalizations17, 
as well as a modest 2009 value-based-
payment initiative rewarding SNFs that 
reduce preventable admissions.18 To 
recognize its responsibility to provide 
dual eligibles quality medical care and 
quality SNF care, Medicare should: 1) 
finance nurse practitioners in nursing 
homes to coordinate frail residents’ 
care (United Healthcare’s Evercare 
program has already demonstrated, 
relative to control groups, that this 
strategy can cut hospitalizations and 
emergency room use in half);19 2) 
apply performance standards, like 
those now applied to hospitals, to 
penalize SNFs with excessive rates of 
preventable hospitalizations for their 
residents (whether or not they are 
receiving SNF care). 
The Bottom Line: Medicare 
Should Do Its Job
Medicare leadership in improving the 
efficiency and quality of care for dual 
eligibles does not eliminate the value 
of state Medicaid initiatives, whether to 
better coordinate all care dual eligibles 
receive or, even more important, the 
long-term care that is Medicaid’s 
focus. And, where states invest in care 
improvements that produce savings, 
sharing those savings with Medicare may 
be appropriate.
But states pay for only 20 percent of 
spending on dual eligibles, very little of 
which goes toward acute care, where 
savings and quality improvement are 
most readily achievable. These services 
are Medicare’s responsibility, and 
the savings are Medicare’s to pursue. 
Allowing state initiatives to absolve 
Medicare of responsibility for improving 
the quality and efficiency of the care it 
finances simply does not make sense. 
Getting better value for Medicare 
dollars for dual eligibles, along with all 
beneficiaries, is simply Medicare’s job. 
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